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Introduction
One thing that really does worry a lot of us is 
the idea of a single aggregate tipping point for 
the earth as a whole – a shift to a state that may 
be much less amenable for human life. (Steffan, 
2006)
The chances of unexpected climate effects 
should not be underestimated, as clearly shown 
by the sudden and unpredicted development of 
the Antarctic ozone hole. (Crutzen, 2006)
There is a mismatch between those [in the 
South] who may be vulnerable to climate change 
and those [in the North] who can afford to do 
anything about it. … [but] Insurance against 
catastrophes is thus an argument for [the North] 
doing something expensive about greenhouse gas 
emissions. (Schelling, 1992)
When the ozone hole appeared, a technological remedy 
was to hand – the substitution of chlorofl urocarbons 
(CFCs) by hydrochlorofl urocarbons (HCFCs) – which 
was implemented quickly by effective international 
agreement and regulatory enforcement imposed upon 
a willing industry. Nevertheless, ultra-violet (UV) 
radiation damage has persisted for many decades as 
a consequence of this ‘surprise’, which was due to a 
previously unknown effect of high altitude ice crystals 
in concentrating CFC’s and accelerating their known 
capacity to destroy ozone. 
At present we are hearing reports of surprise lakes of 
water detected underneath Antarctic ice sheets; in 
Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth we see 
surprise rivers of water disappearing down ‘moulins’ in 
the Greenland glaciers, and we hear of surprisingly high 
measured losses of ice from that vast island. Do these 
little surprises add up to precursor signals of a much 
more rapid collapse of Greenland’s ice cover, and maybe 
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the West Antarctic Ice Sheet too, than has previously 
been imagined possible? 
We do not know the answer to that, but it is 
common sense rather than alarmism to consider what 
precautionary measures may be taken to make us better 
prepared to avoid such a situation should these fears, or 
fears regarding the imminence of other possible runaway 
climate processes, prove to be well founded. Sea level 
rises of 40 feet are a climatic catastrophe that must be 
avoided. That prospect points to the need to adopt an 
outcome-based approach – identifying what it is that 
policy must seek to prevent – to the notion of dangerous 
climate change, rather than relying on expert opinion as 
to a ‘safe’ level of greenhouse gases or ‘safe’ rate of change 
of average surface temperature (King, 2006). There can 
be no ‘expert opinion’ as to the behaviour of a non-linear 
dynamic system, such as earth’s climate, removed to a 
state far different from any experience.2
This paper focuses on policy instruments designed 
to drive the preferential adoption of  two technology 
types – involving carbon-conservative processing of the 
products of the land commercially as food, fi bre and 
fuel (biofuel) – whilst, through tradability, generating 
the cash fl ow needed to fi nance the necessary capital 
investments. These are technologies for getting carbon 
dioxide (CO
2)
 out of the atmosphere, and technologies 
for stocking it (or carbonaceous material derived 
from atmospheric CO
2
) somewhere other than in the 
atmosphere.
1 The author is grateful to Jonathan Boston, Mick Common and Paul 
Ormerod for their helpful comments. All responsibility for the views 
expressed rests with the author. 
2 Of course, there have been levels of CO
2
 of 500 ppm (parts per 
million) or more in the very distant past, but not imposed suddenly 
on a climate system adapted, over the last half million years, to 
between 180 and 300 ppm. We have extremely poor understanding 
of the dynamics of the climate system in such conditions, with some 
potentially crucial feedback mechanisms a matter for speculation 
rather than analysis.
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Carbon neutrality for New Zealand
Article 3.3 of the Rio Climate Change Convention of 
1992, where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, calls on the parties to the convention to take 
cost-effective precautionary measures without delay on 
account of a lack of full scientifi c certainty. Unlike article 
4.2(d) – from which hangs the process that began with 
the 1995 Berlin Mandate and ended with the 2001 
Marrakesh Accords to the Kyoto Protocol – article 
3.3 is a principle to which the parties are committed 
individually, and does not require the conference of 
parties to agree on what action to take collectively.
It has been shown that cost-effective precautionary 
action is, prima facie, possible through the world-wide 
adoption of two technology types (Read and Parshotam, 
2007).3 Neither of these types involves low emissions 
energy, and both are, through bio-energy systems 
yielding close substitutes for fossil fuels, fully compatible 
with the highly durable technologies of thermal power 
generation and locomotive internal combustion engines 
(whether reciprocating or gas turbine) (Smil, 2006). 
Thus, they do not shorten the useful life of most existing 
energy sector assets. But they do involve a change in 
investment behaviour, from investing in extracting fossil 
fuels to investing in land use improvements designed to 
co-produce biomass for bio-energy raw material, along 
with traditional products of the land. 
For practical purposes,4 the photosynthetic fi xing of 
carbon in biomass is the basis for the only technology 
type that gets CO
2
 out of the atmosphere. Thus, 
biosphere carbon stock management means improving 
and expanding the ways we use land so as to grow 
more plants and trees – potentially a big bonus for 
agriculture and forestry. Once fi xed, the stocking of 
carbon elsewhere than in the atmosphere can be: 
• pre-combustion: standing forest;
• post-combustion: CO2 capture and sequestration 
(CCS);
• partial combustion: pyrolysis to yield bio-oils plus 
stable carbon biochar that can be permanently 
stocked in the soil, raising fertility; 
• nothing to do with combustion: wooden houses and 
other structures. 
To clarify subsequent discussion, it is useful to note at 
this point that tradable proportional obligations, with 
the proportionality increasing over time, will emerge 
in this argument as the preferred policy instrument: 
for example, a tradable requirement on transport fuel 
sellers to include a rising proportion of sustainably 
produced biofuel in their product sales, and a tradable 
requirement on sellers of fuel for other uses, and on 
agricultural and other emitters of methane (CH
4
) and 
nitrous oxide (N
2
O), to offset a rising proportion of their 
emissions through carbon storage. ‘Tradable’ means that 
the obligation could be discharged by contracting it to 
a third party – Shell, for example, could contract its 
obligation to BP, Solid Energy to Meridian, or both to 
Weyerhaeuser Inc – thus securing the market effi ciency 
that comes through the ‘equi-marginal’ principle 
(Kolstad, 2000). 
It is obvious that a 100% obligation to use zero 
emissions technologies is, as regards its carbon cycle 
impacts, equivalent to a zero emissions cap. Assuming 
we have accurate forecasts of demand, there are, 
similarly, equivalent levels of proportional obligation 
for any less ambitious cap on emissions. However, 
the psychology is quite different. The emissions cap 
creates an accountants’ paradise, setting one fi rm 
against another, and one country against another, 
in a punitive zero sum game, where the greater the 
burden on others, the less that is required of oneself. 
In contrast, a measure that imposes a required rate 
of take-up of policy-desirable technology types now, 
and which projects increasing take-up in the future, 
releases entrepreneurial energy to get ahead in the race 
for market share and competitive advantage with the 
new technologies.
In the competition between business-as-usual 
technologies and policy-desirable types of technology, 
the policy objective must be to squeeze out investments 
in the most undesirable technologies (such as, for 
3 This paper proved controversial with reviewers for Climatic Change, 
and carries the comments of the latest reviewers, along with my 
rejoinders. The upshot of this was that I was invited to submit 
an editorial essay setting out the ideas involved in our Holistic 
Greenhouse Gas Management Strategy in a less rigorous framework 
than a formal article. This will be published in due course, along with 
invited commentaries from a variety of experts, on the lines of Paul 
Crutzen’s editorial essay of August last year. 
4 Keith and Ha-Duong (2003) have proposed washing CO
2
 out of the 
atmosphere with amine solution in large structures looking like power 
station cooling towers. Per contra photosynthesis, this can be done 
in the middle of a desert and might be an important technology if 
there were a shortage of fertile land.
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instance, the conversion of coal to gasoline).5 This can 
be done by setting clear but fl exible obligations for 
increasing adoption of the policy-desired technology 
types. Clarity comes from a commitment to use long-
run fl exibility to maintain the squeeze on undesirable 
technologies: the obligation is progressively raised so as 
to take up market expansion in excess of a dwindling 
policy-acceptable quantum of fossil fuel use. 
As a small trading nation, New Zealand can, if 
appropriate, source its biofuel from overseas, as it does 
oil now. So, given the turnover of the vehicle fl eet and 
the availability now of fl exi-fuel vehicles, the biofuel 
proportion of New Zealand’s fuel consumption could 
rise to nearly 100% by 2020. On cost grounds, offsets by 
other emitters could take the form of CCS (CO
2
 capture 
and sequestration), if practicable – say, in the depleted 
Maui fi eld – related to very low cost supplies of coal. 
But mostly, for a decade or so until land becomes scarce, 
offsetting would be by new forest plantations, maybe 
overseas. With a clear policy steer, it seems that 100% 
offset could also be achieved before 2030. Together, these 
would make New Zealand ‘carbon neutral’ and easily 
meet any conceivable post-2012 Kyoto commitment. 
Meeting the 2008–2012 commitment may also be 
feasible through such offsets, but would be diffi cult 
owing to a late start with appropriate policy.
Innovative investment 
... the development and widespread adoption 
of new technologies can greatly ameliorate 
what, in the short run, sometimes appear to 
be overwhelming confl icts between economic 
well-being and environmental quality. (Kneese 
and Schultz, 1975)
The implication of Kneese and Schultz’s remark above 
is that the behaviour that matters for policy success is 
investment behaviour that can embody the innovations 
that amount to policy-desirable technological change: 
for instance, CFC’s are replaced by HCFC’s, and acid 
rain is handled by fl ue gas desulphurisation, both by 
investing in new technology. 
There are two interpretations of ‘innovation’. It 
can mean the development and adoption of newly 
researched technologies by a pioneer fi rm, or it can 
mean the adoption of already developed, or partially 
developed, technologies by a follower fi rm that has 
previously relied on traditional technology. The fi rst 
– what some would regard as true innovation – could be 
the design and development of a tidal fl ow generator and 
its installation and use in Cook Strait. Such innovation 
often leads to commercial failure, with follower fi rms 
learning from the pioneer’s mistakes.
The second – what can be called imitative – innovation 
is innovative for the following fi rm even though it is 
not for the economy as a whole. Mostly the second, 
imitative innovation is what is meant in this paper, 
with investments in the widespread diffusion of policy-
desirable technologies that are already quite well known 
and are low risk to the economy as a whole (and that 
likely result also in incremental technological progress, 
through learning by doing). Thus, the crucial questions 
for an effective response to the Kyoto commitment 
are about whether such imitative innovation becomes 
widespread, yielding a qualitative change in the stock of 
capital goods. Will households buy high effi ciency light-
bulbs? Will they insulate their ceilings and windows? 
Will they buy hybrid cars? Will there be a bus to catch? 
Will small- and medium-sized enterprises drive their 
machinery with effi cient electric motors? Will they use 
diesel-powered delivery vans? 
In relation to the threat of rapid or abrupt climate 
change, the questions are more specifi c, since the policy-
priority technology types are more limited. Will the big 
oil fi rms invest in ethanol production, and in a gasohol 
distribution network with a high proportion of ethanol 
in the fuel? Will vehicle importers import fl exi-fuel 
vehicles that can run on gasohol as easily as on gasoline? 
Will fuel suppliers cease drilling and excavating, and 
start tilling and cultivating for their raw materials? 
Risk reduction for the firms involved can come 
from measures that give certainty about the type of 
investment that is needed and assurance that adopting 
policy-priority technology will not result in competitive 
disadvantage. That is what is achieved by the adoption 
of proportional tradable obligations. The required 
technology type is specifi ed, and all competing fi rms 
5 Even if the processing plant incorporates CCS (CO
2
 capture and 
sequestration), any liquid fuel produced will lead to dispersed 
emissions of fossil fuel-derived CO
2
 and continue the policy-
adverse shifting of carbon stocks from deep underground into the 
atmosphere. This does not apply if it is a coal-to-hydrogen process, 
but a hydrogen-fuelled transportation system is decades off – too 
distant if the concern is threatened ACC (anthropogenic climate 
change).
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have to comply, so that the pioneering risk of being 
fi rst is removed.
Problems with a carbon price
Were it not for the burden of accumulated doctrine in 
environmental economics, that is all that would need 
to be said and this article would end here. But there is 
obviously some contradiction if it is possible to say, as 
Stern does:
The fi rst essential element of climate change 
policy is carbon pricing… . Putting
an appropriate price on carbon ... means that 
people pay the full social cost of their action ...
… But the presence of a wide range of other 
market failures and barriers mean that carbon 
pricing alone is not suffi cient. Technology policy 
… is vital to bring forward the range of low-
carbon and high effi ciency technologies that will 
be needed to make deep emissions cuts. (Stern, 
2006, p.308, introducing Part IV on policy 
responses for mitigation)
Of course, it is possible to treat Stern’s fi rst priority as 
mere rhetoric. Nobody knows what the full social cost 
of carbon is. But rhetoric usually serves a purpose and 
here it refl ects the economists’ gut instinct that, if we 
can get prices right, the market will, with help from 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, reach an equilibrium that 
is the best of all possible worlds (providing the question 
of income distribution has been settled equitably by a 
non-market process). Or, if it be an invisible foot, will 
at least do better than any alternative.
Addressing that instinct, it might fi rst be remarked, to 
the wider public that is unfamiliar with the esoterica of 
modern economic theory, that the market paradigm, 
which hangs from the analysis of competitive general 
equilibrium (CGE) formalised by Arrow and Debreu 
(1954), is in tatters at a very fundamental level. CGE 
relies on complete futures and complete contingency 
markets (i.e. on known probability distributions of all 
possible outcomes at all future points in time, and on 
the existence of insurance markets where the cost of 
wrong commercial decisions can be offset against the 
profi t from correct choices).
The work of Stiglitz (1994), summarised in the 
curiously titled ‘Whither Socialism?’, has revealed the 
informational infeasibility of this paradigm; the work 
of Simon (1997) on ‘bounded rationality’ reveals the 
impossibility of market agents making use of such 
information were it available; and empirical studies 
of consumer choice by Kahneman et al. (1991) reveal 
phenomena of loss aversion and status quo bias that are 
incompatible with the neo-classical axioms of consumer 
choice. So we have an invisible foot, and the question 
is, does it score goals? Can a price on carbon do better 
than the alternative advanced here?
Obviously a carbon price will do something, and we 
must fi rst note what kind of thing the invisible foot 
can do well, and where it trips up. For this we can 
do no better than these words written before modern 
mathematical economics set off on its eventually fruitless 
long march in pursuit of Adam Smith’s conjecture:
Market prices, however, refl ect the economic 
situation as it is and not as it will be. For this 
reason they are more useful for coordinating 
current decisions, which are immediately effective 
and guided by short term considerations, than 
they are for coordinating investment decisions. 
(Scitovsky, 1954)
So, in situations involving immediate outcomes, 
prices can do a good job: for instance, the recently-
introduced congestion charge is highly effective in 
causing Londoners to catch a bus rather than drive 
into the city.6 The complications of modern economic 
theory mean that the effect of a carbon tax on current 
decisions is hard to predict, but if it is not suffi cient 
the tax can be increased to get the desired effect – as 
is the case in London where the congestion charge 
has gone up from its initial £5 to £8. With a price on 
carbon, maybe people will switch the lights off, tread 
lightly on the throttle, catch a bus and so on. Such good 
resolutions tend to wear off with time, unless reinforced 
by progressive price increases or continuing moral 
suasion through public education campaigns such as 
those EECA (the Energy Effi ciency and Conservation 
Authority) mounts so well. 
Precautionary action and carbon prices
However, in relation to climate change it is not these 
decisions that greatly matter, but the investment 
6 I am grateful to Paul Ormerod for suggesting this example.
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decisions discussed previously, and it is there that price 
signalling does the bad job noted by Scitovsky. Before 
turning to some practical considerations relating to 
the carbon price, however, and its relation to tradable 
proportional obligations, we must note a specific 
problem with carbon pricing in relation to the threat 
of abrupt or rapid climate change. Largely forgotten by 
policy makers, it is clearly apparent in the seminal text 
on applying CGE theory to environmental policy:
If it is [a] sufficiently strong detrimental 
externality, … [it] must produce a non-convexity 
in the social production set. (Baumol and Oates, 
1988, p.116)
The diagram, adapted from Baumol and Oates, illustrates 
the situation. The curve RAR´ is the convex production 
possibility frontier familiar to Econ 101 students. It is 
developed from the assumption of diminishing returns 
to scale in the production of two goods, y
1 
and y
2 
– say, 
consumption goods for this generation and consumption 
goods for future generations.7 By doing without now 
and investing for the future, more is available to our 
descendants. At the simplest level of analysis, neglecting 
the diffi culties of modern theory noted above, a point 
such as A is selected by market forces where the slope of 
the curve, equal to the discount factor,8 represents the 
willingness of investors to forgo current consumption in 
order to profi t from investment. The higher the discount 
factor – the greedier we are and the less we provide for 
the future – the steeper the slope and the further point 
A moves to the right and downwards, forcing future 
generations to suffer a lower level of consumption, y
2
, 
since we have chosen a higher value of y
1
. 
Suppose we take RAR´ to represent a situation where 
today’s consumption causes no environmental damage. 
However, if the already excessive stock of greenhouse 
gas is increased by current consumption, then future 
production is diminished by the impact of resulting 
climate change, and the production possibility frontier 
looks like RBR´. The invisible foot can still score 
well, providing that the externality enters the price 
system – for example, through a carbon tax – with the 
point where the slope equals the discount factor now 
somewhat to the left of y
1. 
Thus, market forces result in 
more ‘doing without’ by the present generation. This 
results in more investment to reduce environmental 
damage and/or compensate future generations. That is 
what Kyoto is all about.
If, however, the externality is suffi ciently severe, the 
production possibility function falls to RCR´, a straight 
line that has constant slope and which therefore does 
not have a unique point where the slope equals the 
discount factor: the invisible foot shoots wide. Worse 
still is the environmental catastrophe pictured by RDR´, 
where the market will drive the system to either R or 
R´, scoring an own goal of starvation and extinction in 
either the fi rst half or second half of the game. Given 
that future generations aren’t fi elding a team today, 
and that turkeys don’t vote for Christmas, it is obvious 
what choice would be made. It is this that leads Baumol 
and Oates (1988, p.31) to conclude that the choice, 
as regards the level of mitigating activity, must then 
‘somehow be made collectively, rather than by automatic 
market processes’.
The heuristic argument employed here is no substitute 
for a formal dynamic analysis that takes account of 
uncertainty regarding the impact on future generations 
of investments made in the present; or of the possibility 
of alternative investments in sustainable technology, 
7 This is to play a little fast and loose with the production possibility 
frontier concept, which is normally concerned with alternative goods 
produced in current time (or the timeless world of CGE). However, the 
Baumol and Oates example of soot from a power station smokestack 
causes production of electricity (y
1
) to damage the productivity of 
a laundry (y
2
) hanging out its washing to dry. Such unidirectional 
causality from y
1
 to y
2
 is consistent with the movement in time from 
this generation to future generations. 
8 The discount factor = 1+r, where r is the discount rate or the risk-
adjusted rate of interest.
y
2
R
O y
1
* y
1R´
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rather than business-as-usual technology, retaining hope 
of the RAR´ world. Perrings (1987) moves beyond the 
comparative statics of Baumol and Oates to analyse the 
linked economy–environment system, with time playing 
an essential role, and concludes:
It follows that a high discount rate that raises 
the current rate of exploitation of environmental 
resources will be associated with increasing 
disposals, increasing environmental damage, 
increasing uncertainty and consequent higher 
still discount rates in the future. (p.136)
Perrings shows that relying on markets to resolve 
environmental problems generates increasing 
uncertainty, progressive myopia and heightened risk 
– which we may judge an unacceptable risk in relation 
to the UNFCCC’s (the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’s) article 3.3.
Keeping both baby and bath-water
However, the teaching of environmental economics 
has stuck with the static analysis of Baumol and Oates 
and has nothing to say on the crucial issue raised by 
Kneese and Schultz, i.e. how to stimulate investment 
in policy-desirable technological change.9 That may not 
matter if climate change is the very long-term problem 
of gradual change envisaged by the architects of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and indeed by the IPCC (2001). But 
it does matter – traditional teaching is of no avail – if 
concerns regarding Steffan’s tipping point prove to be 
well founded.
A universal uniform carbon tax is not a solution 
I can imagine. … No greenhouse taxing agency 
is going to collect a trillion dollars per year 
in revenue. … Reduce the tax by an order of 
magnitude and it becomes imaginable, but 
then it becomes trivial as greenhouse policy. 
(Schelling, 1992)
The traditional teaching remembered by economic 
advisers within governments does not equip them to 
appreciate that, if the need is to step back from Steffan’s 
brink, practicable levels for a carbon price may not drive 
the needed technological change fast enough. Policy 
makers must understand the strong theoretical grounds 
for believing that price mechanisms cannot succeed10 
where tradable proportional obligations can (hopefully, 
providing we are not already so far over the brink 
– given that time lags in the system prevent us seeing the 
consequences of our actions to date – that escape from 
a 40-foot rise in sea levels is already impossible).
But to abandon Kyoto is both unnecessary and 
undesirable. However poorly designed it may be in 
relation to tipping point concerns, it is the cement of 
international collective action on climate change, and 
a necessary framework for addressing the long-term 
concerns of article 4. So action under article 3.3 must 
be complementary to Kyoto and addressed to different 
concerns: e.g. addressing the threat of a tipping point. 
As regards policy measures, if Kyoto commitments 
are to be achieved through emissions permit trading, 
complementarity can be achieved by imposing the 
obligation as a condition of permit issue, as described 
elsewhere (Read, 2006). If the carbon tax proposal is 
revived, a similar result can be achieved by a tax relief 
mechanism, though with less certainty of effect, due to 
the problems with prices discussed above.
Practical aspects of tradable propor-
tional obligations
Commercial behaviour
Schelling’s order-of-magnitude reduction in carbon 
price is what results from the proportional obligation 
approach. Progressively raising the proportionality 
9 Of course, research economists do better – vide section 6.5.3 in 
IPCC (2001). But, as for the textbooks, neither ‘innovation’ nor 
‘investment’ feature in the index of Baumol and Oates (1988). Of 
eight texts drawn at random from the library shelves, three follow 
suit (Tietenberg, 2006; Gilpin, 1999; and Perman et al., 1999; four 
(Perrings, 1987; Common, 1988 and 1995; and Neary and van 
Wijnbergen, 1986) mention investment in the index, mainly from a 
macroeconomic perspective; and only one (Kolstad, 2000) mentions 
innovation/invention, though with no discussion of motivation for, 
or barriers to, investment in innovations beyond the conventional 
assumption that a carbon price (in the climate change context) would 
be more effective than regulation. 
10 Conventional investment appraisal requires a cash fl ow estimate 
both for such investments and for investments in the next best 
(business-as-usual, say) alternative over the decade or so life of 
the asset. But all market players have is a history of the price for 
fossil fuels and a very short run of data on the price of carbon, 
the fi rst highly volatile and the second different in different places 
and subject to policy makers’ changing priorities. The European 
Carbon Exchange price for December 2007 settlement fell from ~16 
euros a year ago to <2 euros in February 2007. The price for 2008 
settlement was more stable but still fell from ~18 to ~14 euros per 
tonne CO
2
 over the period. Yet it is the difference between these two 
highly uncertain future prices that would determine a conventional 
investment appraisal, uncertainty that leads to the use of a very high 
risk adjusted rate of interest for the investment appraisal and thus to 
a low elasticity of demand to invest in policy-desirable innovation, 
and hence to an apparent need for very high carbon prices. 
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involves incurring the fi nancing costs of investing in 
an increasing proportion of policy-desirable innovative 
output. It means that the cost of funding investments 
in innovation is spread across the whole volume of 
sales, resulting, in the current context, in an order-
of-magnitude smaller price on carbon than is arrived 
at by a static, CGE-based approach to the marginal 
cost of emissions reductions (i.e. the rhetorical ‘full 
social cost’). 
This parallels commercial practice, where innovation 
is funded out of super-normal profit retained by 
successful firms whose products are sufficiently 
attractive for them to be priced at above production 
costs. The obligation requires all fi rms to retain more 
profi t – i.e. to raise prices a little – in order to fund the 
additional cost of investments in the two policy-desired 
technology types relevant to tipping point threats. That 
such investments are likely to be low-cost, possibly 
even profi table, follows from the high prospective cost 
of ‘peak oil’ and the high value of co-producing timber 
with biomass energy raw material.
Equity 
The rise in prices involved represents the carbon price 
induced by the proportional obligation. Such a carbon 
price is one that makes sense to the consumer and voter: 
it is passing on the costs of doing business in a policy-
acceptable way. The consumer accepts price increases 
due to real costs without question, as has been the 
case with the yo-yoing price of petrol in the last year.11 
Such a small carbon price is preferable to the widely 
canvassed notion of exposing New Zealand to the world 
price of carbon, since energy taxes are highly regressive 
(Common, 1988); preferable, that is, until such time as 
proportional obligations come to be widely recognised 
as the preferred way of meeting Kyoto commitments, 
and the world price of carbon falls to its level in 
New Zealand.
Apart from domestic equity, there is the North-South 
equity issue raised in our initial quotation from 
Schelling (1992) – an inequity that is exacerbated, 
at least in the view of the South, by the historic 
responsibility of the North for most of the current 
excess stock of CO
2
 in the atmosphere. Given the 
comparative advantage of the South in the land-
based activities involved in the two policy-preferred 
technology types, growing biomass and terrestrial 
stocking of carbon, implementation of proportional 
obligations will result in substantial investment in, and 
technology transfer to, a large number of developing 
countries. 
As discussed elsewhere (Read and Parshotam, 2007), this 
can provide the basis for sustainable rural development 
and economic growth led by exports of liquid biofuels. 
Since the agents for these direct foreign investments and 
technology transfers are private sector fi rms driven by 
tradable proportional obligations, the transfers involved 
are manifestly not a substitute for offi cial (government 
to government) assistance, an issue of concern to the 
China and G77 group. 
Earmarked taxes
This is one of several advantages (apart from equity 
aspects) enjoyed by proportional obligations (or the tax 
relief alternative mentioned above) relative to proposals 
for taxes, or to permit auction revenues that expose New 
Zealand to the international price of carbon as dummy 
for the unknown full social cost. 
Among other things, such exposure extracts profi ts 
that could be used for financing policy-desirable 
investment. It has been suggested that this loss of 
private sector investment fi nance could be remedied 
by recycling the tax or auction revenue into a fund 
for policy-desirable investments (Ward, 2007). Quite 
apart from the capacity of the investment process to 
assimilate the very large cash fl ows involved in a carbon 
price set at the international level, and setting aside 
the traditional Treasury resistance to earmarking tax 
revenues, this procedure would involve public fi nance 
accountability, introducing unnecessary transactions 
costs and hampering the deployment of entrepreneurial 
initiative. 
For instance, under public accountability, transactions 
would need to be transparent, with a level playing fi eld 
between, say, one prospective owner of marginal land 
for energy plantations and another. But an entrepreneur, 
operating under a proportional obligation, could offer 
a high reward to the fi rst landowner to take the plunge, 
11 It is unimaginable that such price variation would have been 
accepted if it had arisen as a tax on road fuel varying at the month-
to-month whim of the minister of fi nance – witness the European 
fuel tax protests of 2000–2001 (Mitchell and Dolun, 2001) and the 
‘fart tax’ demonstrations in New Zealand.
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and lower payments to follow-on landowners taking 
lower risks. Such discrimination, extracting surplus 
value and cutting costs, is natural to entrepreneurs but 
foreign to the use of taxpayers’ money, which has to be 
seen to be fair.
Also, private sector entrepreneurship, operating 
under limited liability, can make mistakes and go 
broke, whereas publicly-funded programmes become 
embedded in permanent bureaucracies, with a tendency 
to throw good money after bad. So the design of a 
policy instrument, besides protecting the consumer 
from needless price increases, should also aim to channel 
cash fl ows through the private sector, as is the case with 
tradable proportional obligations.
Conclusion
In relation to avoiding the greatest dangers from 
climate change, the policy-preferred technology types 
are biotic fi xation of CO
2
 and various storages of 
carbon out of the atmosphere. Rising levels of tradable 
proportional obligations are an effective instrument 
for driving take-up of these technology types. An 
implicit carbon price finances a rising volume of 
policy-desirable innovation. This runs counter to 
common perceptions that market mechanisms can 
address serious damage risks, and that exposing New 
Zealand to the world price of carbon would be an 
effective approach. Future Kyoto commitments are 
easily met, providing a substantial proportion of the 
storages are consistent with the Kyoto Protocol’s rules 
(e.g. afforestation). The carbon price that results might 
be quite small given the apparently long-term high 
cost of oil12 and low cost of carbon storage in forest 
plantations. Certainly it will be smaller than the world 
price established under the cap and trade approach 
(unless other parties also adopt similar policies). In 
keeping the price of carbon quite low, domestic equity 
problems are substantially ameliorated, and problems 
in the internationally competitive at-risk sector are 
also substantially addressed. 
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